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Abstract
Constitutions have many dimensions. These dimensions include at least the
following:
•
•
•
•
•
•

an economic constitution in the sense of a set of rules for exchange of value and
authority,
an interfunctional constitution that allows for the integration of various social
values,
a political constitution that reflects the cultural and democratic integrity of a
group of people,
a legal and judicial constitution that provides rules for the making of other rules,
and for determining supremacy and the scope of judicial application of rules,
a human rights constitution that limits the sphere of governmental authority, and
a redistributive constitution founded on social solidarity.

The WTO constitution has already grown along some of these dimensions. As we
assess the constitutional development of the WTO, we must first analyze these
dimensions separately. Second, we must examine how these dimensions relate to one
another. Third, we must examine how these dimensions of the WTO “constitution” relate
to the general international legal system’s constitution. Finally, we must examine how
these dimensions of the WTO “constitution” relate to the domestic constitutions of the
WTO’s member states.

1

Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

2

Introduction
Constitutional discourse may foreclose possibilities, or it may expand
possibilities. This paper focuses on the ways in which constitutional discourse may
enable us to see possibilities at the WTO, and more broadly in international society, that
might not otherwise be apparent. However, it must be recognized that constitutional
discourse has a dark side: the possibility of false necessity and false rigidity that may
come of assertions that certain legal rules are constitutional and therefore are above
politics.
A constitution is like the fabled elephant at the hands of six blind men.2 Each
imagines a different animal based on his encounter with a different part of the elephant.
To grapple with the constitutional structure of the WTO, it is necessary to recognize the
different parts of the elephant, and then to try to envision the entire animal. Each part is
important in itself, but cannot be assessed separately from the whole. Thus, the
evaluative process presented in this paper is analytical and then synthetic.
There are those who touch a constitution, and only perceive one of the following:
1. an economic constitution in the sense of a set of rules for exchange of value and
authority,
2. an interfunctional constitution that allows for the integration of various social
values,
3. a political constitution that reflects the cultural and democratic integrity of a group
of people,
4. a legal and judicial constitution that provides rules for the making of other rules,
and for determining supremacy and the scope of application of rules,
5. a human rights constitution that limits the sphere of governmental authority, and
6. a redistributive constitution founded on social solidarity.
In fact, like the organs of an animal, each of these components is inextricably
intertwined and interdependent with the others. It is this essay’s goal to begin to suggest
the outlines of the whole animal. It is hoped to suggest some of the sinews and systems
that link the different parts. We must recognize that while the WTO is a young animal
that needs all of its organs to survive, some will grow with age. This is complicated
enough.
Yet we must also recognize that the WTO constitution is itselfbut a part of a
broader structure for the global system. Not only are there several elephants in our
picture, but these elephants live in symbiosis, sharing organs with one another. Thus, we
would again be missing the whole picture if we focused exclusively on the WTO
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constitution. Rather, it is necessary to examine the WTO constitution in the context of
the general public international law system, and in relation to the other components of
that system. Indeed, the general public international law system, including its
subsystems, must be evaluated in constitutional terms.
The WTO constitution is a semi-autonomous system within the broader
international legal system.3 But due to its dependence on and interaction with the broader
international legal system, it is not possible to analyze the WTO constitution fully
without analyzing the broader structure.4 This would be as incomplete as analyzing the
constitution of Massachusetts without examining the U.S. federal constitution, although it
is not precisely analogous. A complete analysis would include the relationship between
the WTO legal system and the broader international legal system.
Furthermore, the WTO interacts with, draws support from, and constrains
domestic constitutional orders. So we must examine the WTO constitution not only in
relation to the broader international legal system, but also in relation to the domestic
constitutional structures of the member states of the WTO. Again, it is incorrect to
criticize the WTO for constitutional weaknesses or excesses where these are addressed by
constitutional structures at the member state level. But we must also examine the extent
to which WTO law may inhibit constitutional structures at the member state level, and
consequently examine whether this inhibition should be stopped, or whether it may be
better to effect the relevant constitutional function at the WTO level. Thus, “negative”
constitutional integration—inhibition of domestic constitutional functions—must be
countered with “positive” constitutional integration: establishment of constitutional
structures at the WTO level.
Finally, while comparison between the WTO “constitution” and domestic
constitutions is useful for this very reason, it must be approached with great caution, as
these constitutions exist in sharply different social contexts, with sharply different
functions.
So, we have a minimum of three intertwined “elephants.” The constitutional
structures at each of the domestic, WTO and general international legal system levels
relate to one another.5 The question of the relationship among the state, the WTO and the
3
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general international legal system constitutions may be understood as one of subsidiarity:
at what level are particular constitutional functions best effected? We can begin to
perceive a principle of constitutional subsidiarity. This is different from the normal
principle of subsidiarity, which may be understood as a principle of allocation of
authority, thereby addressing only one element of constitutionalization. The principle of
constitutional subsidiarity deals not with primary rules, but with secondary rules, and
asks at which level, and in which functional setting, constitutional functions should be
effected.
While the state and the WTO might be understood as existing in a vertical
relationship, we might understand the WTO and the general international legal system as
existing in either a vertical or a horizontal relationship.6 But the allocations are not static.
They are dynamic in a variety of ways, both formal and informal. So in order to
understand each individual structure, and in order to understand the contingent nature of
each individual structure, it is necessary to analyze the dynamic basis for allocation of
authority among these subsystems.
One might well ask, at the conclusion of this analytical and synthetic process, is
there anything essential about any of these animals? Perhaps an elephant has an essence,
but does a constitution? Is this where the elephant analogy thankfully stops? To press it
one step further, this essay suggests that, in evolutionary terms, the constitutional
elephant evolves for the benefit of its cells: the individual constituents. The point is that
the constitution does not exist as some essential form in itself, but rather evolves as an
instrument for the benefit of individual constituents. Thus, this essay rejects corporatist
or other approaches that suggest that constitutionalization has intrinsic value, and
embraces the contingency and plasticity of constitutions.
The Language of the WTO Constitution Debate
Defining terms can enhance debate. And few legal terms engender more
misunderstanding than “constitution.” It is difficult to say what is the core meaning of
“constitution,” and what is a trope. Anthropologists say that we only see what we know,
and in this sense we are all partially blind as we approach a constitution. In discussions
of constitutions, each analyst arrives with a culturally-rooted image that obscures the full
structure. Therefore, it is not only unacceptable, but impossible, to speak about a WTO
“constitution,” either with compatriots or with foreigners.7 Yet in two important ways, it
is necessary to try to do so.
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First, the WTO already has a constitution—in the same sense thatthe EU had a
constitution before the recent constitutional convention and just as the U.S. Articles of
Confederation were, indeed, a constitution. To pretend that there is no constitution in this
rather technical sense is to pretend that the emperor has no clothes. Yet viewing the
WTO in constitutional terms is especially difficult for United States citizens, as the U.S.
Constitution is constitutive of a particular domestic society, and, more than any other
constitution, has attained iconic, even deified, significance. We also have difficulty
accepting multiple overlapping constitutions, as we in the U.S. associate our own
constitution with a kind of exclusive allegiance, and sovereignty. Yet reality requires
recognition of multiple sovereignties, multiple allegiances and multiple constitutions.
Indeed, we in the U.S., like those in the EU, should be more prepared than others to
accept the ambiguities involved in multiple constitutions.8
In the U.S. and EU systems of dual constitutions, at the local and at the central
levels, a third type of rule has developed in the H.L.A. Hart hierarchy.9 Primary rules are
normal legislation. Secondary rules are more in the nature of constitutional rules,
determining authority to legislate, interpret and determine conflicts between primary
rules. But there can also be conflicts between secondary rules. A special type of
secondary rule, or perhaps one would call it a “tertiary rule,” determines the allocation of
authority between constitutions.10 The principle of constitutional subsidiarity, suggested
above, might be understood as a kind of tertiary rule. But there may be others, and they
may be more specific. Even in systems like the U.S., where it is now generally
recognized that the central constitution is supreme, there is an inter-constitutional
dialogue, carried on by both courts and legislatures, that in a nuanced manner allocates
authority between state constitutions and the federal constitution. This type of dialogue
has been extensive and explicit in the EU.11 There is also a nascent dialogue between the
U.S. Constitution and the international legal “constitution.”12
Implicit in this concept of “tertiary rules” is the non-exclusivity of
constitutionalization. That is, it is possible to have multiple levels and locations at which
constitutionalization takes place. The nation-state holds no monopoly. The principle of
exclusive sovereignty has never been true.13 This non-exclusivity may be associated with
the non-exclusivity of levels and locations in which people relate to one another: with
8
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subsidiarity. It is in this sense that the non-exclusivity of constitutionalization seems
congruent with the non-exclusivity of political relations.
Second, the WTO will increasingly need to draw on constitutional functions along
all of the parameters assessed here. This is because the relationships that the WTO
addresses will increase in scope, complexity,and importance, and will therefore drive
and benefit from constitutional growth.14 These constitutional functions will become
necessary despite the concern many citizens and diplomats have about
constitutionalization of the WTO. However, once we analyze the term “constitution”, it
will be seen that there is less to fear than if we imagine the kind of iconic or mystical
constitution that many believe can only occur at the level of the state. Renato Ruggiero,
former Director-General of the WTO, was famously criticized for using the term
“constitution” in reference to the WTO.15
Third, it is not a contradiction to say that when the WTO needs constitutional
functions, those functions may be effected elsewhere. As we imagine the WTO
constitution, we must recognize that it is a component of a broader global “constitution.”
The broader global constitution is in most respects an unwritten constitution—consisting
largely of customary international law—but it consists of those rules of secondary
international law that may be understood as “constitutional.” These include, but are not
limited to, “secondary” rules that determine how primary rules are made, including the
rules of custom and the rules of treaty. Much analytical detail would be lost in imagining
the WTO as a wholly separate system. Rather, accurate analysis requires, in most cases,
consideration of the WTO within its broader context. It is ignorant to decry the gaps in
the WTO “constitution” without examining to what extent these gaps may be filled by the
global “constitution.”
By referring to all these phenomena as “constitutional”, do we risk losing
analytical focus or normative content? Perhaps others would argue that one or another of
the facets of constitutionalization described here is the “real” constitutionalization, and
that the “real” constitutionalization is diluted by inclusion of other facets. However, the
analysis here suggests that none of these facets may be considered alone, and this paper’s
theoretical perspective rejects the kind of peremptory value ascribed by some authors to
human rights generally, to the integrity of a “people” or even to political legitimacy per
14
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se. It finds the facet often emphasized in legal literature—direct effect, supremacy and
judicial review—to be rather narrow. It also recognizes the merely instrumental value of
the allocation of legislative and judicial authority.
More importantly, by ascribing constitutional significance to features of the
WTO, do we risk diminishing the state as an existing “constitutional” community? If the
present essay can de-mystify the components of constitutionalization, perhaps it can allay
fears that something essential (but unidentifiable) will be lost by ascribing constitutional
significance to some features of the WTO. It will be seen that the WTO does not
necessarily compete with the state for loyalty; rather it will and should coexist with the
state. Importantly, if the WTO and the state were true to the theoretical structure set out
here, the WTO would do no more than support the state in carrying out the state’s
mandate to better the lot of individual constituents.16
This essay is intended to add to the existing literature regarding the WTO
“constitution”17 by broadening the discussion to includeissues beyond human rights,
16
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federalism and inter-judicial relations, and, more importantly, to begin to draw the
relationship among the different facets of the WTO constitution and its development.
This paper seeks to ground its understanding of these developments in the theory of
constitutional economics.18
Constitutions, Constitutionalism, Constitutionalization and Metrics
Of course, constitutions have different roles and meanings in different social
settings. Moreover, as societies change, the type of constitution that may have been
optimal at one point in time may no longer be desirable.19
“Constitutionalism” refers to a position advocating more or greater constitutional
structure: advocating constitutionalization. However, in order to define the goal of
constitutionalism, we need a metric of constitutionalization. How would we know when
constitutional structure is increased or reduced? If, as this paper suggests, there are
multiple dimensions of constitutionalization, how do we relate these different dimensions
to one another in measuring constitutionalization? Perhaps even more importantly, is it
possible to know when constitutionalization is normatively attractive—whether
constitutionalism is normatively sound?
Methodological individualism would recognize that the central feature of
constitutionalization is sharing power. So, we may develop a metric for
constitutionalization in terms of the degree to which constitutional arrangements result in
shared authority. Yet sharing power is by no means always good. Normative
individualism answers the normative questions by reference to the individual and his or
her preferences. Thus, constitutionalization is attractive where it enhances the ability of
individuals to achieve their preferences. These preferences must include altruistic and
esthetic preferences. Where constitutionalization does not enhance the ability of
individuals to achieve their preferences, it is not normatively attractive.
Constitutionalization is not intrinsically good, but is instrumental to the achievement of
other values.
However, as we will see below, there are many parameters of
constitutionalization to consider, and in a particular setting, institutional intensification—
constitutionalization—might be appropriate in respect of one parameter, but not in
18
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respect of others. So, one question for the institutional designer—for the constitutional
draftsman—is how to constitutionalize in some areas but not in others. This question is
especially thorny where the boundaries between subject matter areas are difficult to draw.
Where does “commerce” end and “human rights” begin? Thus, constitutions like the
U.S. Constitution and the Treaty of Rome allocate power to regulate interstate and
international commerce to the center, but the definition of regulation of commerce, and of
commerce itself, is elastic under pressure. This elasticity results in a variable allocation
of authority that is adjustable over time. What is the relationship between allocation of
legislative authority to the center, and judicial review at the center? What is the
relationship between allocation of legislative authority to the center and centralized
capacity for redistribution?
Finally, constitutionalization must be understood in at least two, and perhaps
three, dimensions. In the international setting, this concept has a “levels” problem. In a
domestic setting, one central hallmark of constitutionalization is the restraint of the
state—setting limits on the legislative capacity of the state. Of course, in this limited
sense, all international law may be viewed in terms of constitutionalization: the central
vocation of international law is to set limits on the legislative capacity of the state.
Therefore, when we speak of constitutionalization at the WTO, we must be referring to
something other than restraint of the state. One feature may be to set limits on the
legislative capacity of the WTO. But therein lies a fundamental contradiction. By setting
limits on the legislative capacity of the WTO, we would implicitly be reducing the scope
to set limits on the legislative capacity of the state. In this potential meaning of
constitutionalization, constitutionalization at one level is inconsistent with
constitutionalization at the other level. We can break out of this conundrum by
developing a more nuanced understanding of constitutionalization. This more nuanced
understanding is not so much concerned with limits, but with capacities. To what extent
are the essential tasks that we assign to “constitutions” effected satisfactorily? At the
international level, to what extent are constitutional features useful to achieve the goals of
constituents? The six features of constitutionalization advanced in this paper should be
understood in this sense.
Economic Constitutions and Constitutional Moments
Constitutional economics brings a positivist analytical perspective to
constitutions. Under this approach, constitutions are simply instruments of human
interaction: mechanisms by which to share authority in order to facilitate the
establishment of rules. Constitutional rules are not natural law; instead, they are political
settlements designed to maximize the achievement of individual citizens’ preferences. In
a transaction cost or strategic model, constitutions are designed to overcome transaction
costs or strategic barriers to Pareto superior outcomes.
Thus, from this perspective, if there were no potential value to be obtained from
cooperation, constitutions would be unimportant, and would not exist. Constitutions exist
to resolve transaction costs and strategic problems that would otherwise prevent the
achievement of efficient exchanges of authority. Where there is value to be obtained by
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agreement, constitutions may be used to facilitate the realization of this value by reducing
transaction costs and strategic costs, such as the problem of states holding out or
defecting from their commitments.
For example, one of the central features of the WTO constitution relates to rules
for the suppression of protectionism. These rules are thought of as constitutional when,
like the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, they discipline domestic
regulation that may create excessive barriers to trade. In a sense, these rules against
protectionism are specialized rules of dynamic subsidiarity. They contingently remove
power from the state under a specified range of circumstances.
And yet, these types of adjudicative standards, though constitutional in stature,
compete with legislative solutions to the same problems. Legislative solutions—known
in this context as “positive integration”—might develop regimes of harmonization or
recognition, or blended regimes of harmonization and recognition, as in the EU “essential
harmonization” program. These legislative solutions could enjoy greater political support
than judicial decisions addressing the same issues.
It is in this regard that negative integration devices, such as those in the WTO that
may be used to strike down domestic regulatory regimes, may create demand for positive
integration devices, such as those associated with majority voting. Deregulation through
negative integration may create demand for re-regulation at the central level through
majority-voting based legislative capacity. Here we see an important tendon connecting
economic constitutions with political constitutions. Majority voting among states might
give rise to demands for greater democratic legitimacy. Pascal Lamy, former trade
Commissioner of the EU, has called for a WTO parliamentary consultative assembly for
just this reason.20
So the causal chain might appear as follows:
Perceived protectionism stronger adjudication perceived imbalance
stronger legislation perceived democratic deficit parliamentary control
This hypothesized causal chain shows a link between two governance components
within the economic constitutional category: adjudication and legislation. It also shows
a link between the legislative component and the political constitutions category
20
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discussed below. The possibility of centralized legislation is obviously linked to the need
for centralized democratic accountability.
Furthermore, a constitution may produce its own demand: once established, by
reducing transaction costs and strategic costs of international arrangements, constitutions
would be expected to make attractive a host of arrangements that were otherwise
unattractive. There may be a path dependency characteristic to constitutional
development, with tipping points that result in lumpy movement or punctuated equilibria.
Thus, once a centralized legislative and parliamentary feature are established for one
purpose, it may make it easier to use them for other purposes.
Constitutional economics recognizes the possibility of constitutional moments. A
“constitutional moment” in the Buchanan and Tullock sense is an historical moment at
which a Harsanyian “veil of uncertainty” allows individuals, or in our case states, to
agree on constitutional change even though they are uncertain of the possible future
implications. In fact, it is the uncertainty that facilitates agreement. Constitutional
moments generally result from a shift in the concerns, or perception of concerns, of
constituents. This perspective explains agreement to secondary rules: rules such as
majority voting regimes, or allocations of authority, that determine the ability to make
primary rules that actually govern behavior. In this theoretical perspective, states would
agree on new secondary rules where they are certain enough that they will be benefited in
the aggregate, but uncertain about how much of the benefit they may capture.
Constitutional change would be expected to occur when there are shifts in state
preferences, shifts in the technological or institutional means to achieve those
preferences, or shifts in states’ perceptions of these things. What types of shifts might
result in a future constitutional moment at the WTO? It is difficult to say, but issues such
as increasing public awareness and concern about the WTO, pressures from other global
interests including environmental protection, human rights and health, increasing concern
regarding global poverty and the role of trade, and fear of terrorism could contribute to a
tectonic movement at the WTO.
In the context of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which produced the
WTO in 1994, we may imagine that the move to stronger dispute settlement resulted
from a constitutional moment, in which two kinds of trade-offs were made.
First, the U.S. stipulated that it would not give up unilateralism under Section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974 unless stronger dispute settlement were established in the WTO.
This stipulation was intended to end discussion of Section 301, but the U.S.’ principal
trade partners accepted the challenge. In the ensuing negotiations, the U.S. gave up the
right to take unilateral action to enforce its rights under WTO law, in exchange for
strengthened dispute settlement.
Second, it was expected that stronger dispute settlement would make
commitments stronger. As the commitments are generally consistent with liberalization,
this would result in greater liberalization. In 1994, the parties did not know which states
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would benefit most from stronger dispute settlement. However, they may plausibly have
believed that all would benefit to some degree, and been willing to accept the possibility
that others would benefit more.
We return to the constitutional economics theoretical framework throughout this
paper. This theoretical framework, both in normative and positive terms, allows us in the
first instance to draw together the different components of constitutionalization described
herein. We will also refer to more specific connections among the components that can
make it difficult to constitutionalize along one parameter without constitutionalizing
along others.
To summarize, constitutional economics sees constitutions as devices to enhance
achievement of preferences. The task of framers of constitutions, and of analysts, is to
engage in comparative institutional analysis21—even if the reference is historical or
hypothetical—in order to determine which institutional features will maximize the net
achievement of preferences. So, each of the other components of constitutionalization is
harnessed to this same task.
Interfunctional Constitutions
Of course, one of the signal problems of the WTO today is its relationship with
other organizations, other sources of international law, and non-trade values.22 In the
Hart sense, we need rules for the allocation of authority not among individuals, or states,
but among functional agents of states. To the limited extent that the WTO is merely the
avatar of trade, while for example the ILO is the avatar of labor rights and the UNHCHR
is the avatar of human rights, we need rules that allocate authority among these agents.
The relationship between trade values (growth or prosperity) and other values,
like environmental protection, consumer protection, competition law, bank regulation or
labor rights (not to mention human rights, discussed separately below), is a critical
challenge to the WTO. And the 1994 advance in dispute settlement at the WTO has
raised concerns about how the WTO deals with multilateral environmental treaties,
international labor standards and human rights treaties, which often do not have access to
mandatory dispute settlement.
Thus, another facet of constitutionalization addresses the extent to which broad
social values are integrated with one another, and more specifically, the way in which
market concerns are integrated with non-market concerns. It is striking that both the U.S.
and the EC began with emphases on commercial relations, and developed broader
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capacities over time. It is also striking that each domestic government has the
institutional capacity to deal with inter-functional trade-offs.
It is in this sense that constitutionalization is concerned with capacities: here the
capacity to integrate diverse values. Functional subsidiarity counsels against aggregating
all multilateral power to the WTO, while increasing functional linkages makes some
kinds of intersectoral coherence useful.23 In order to assess the degree of coherence, we
must look both within and without the WTO.
Within the WTO, we can see the development of a modest approach to
intersectoral coherence in the WTO’s reference to standards promulgated by international
standards organizations. We can also see it in the Appellate Body’s Shrimp-Turtle
decision, which referred to an international environmental agreement in order to assist in
interpreting some of the exceptional provisions of the WTO Agreements. But the
international community may need to develop more complete and predictable
mechanisms to promote coherence between trade policy and other policies. These will
not necessarily result in uniform enforceability of all international law. States need
flexibility to create both harder and softer international law. This counsels against
blanket calls for direct effect of WTO law in domestic legal orders,24 and for the
enforcement of other international law in WTO dispute settlement.
Developing countries have been reluctant to bring human rights, labor rights, or
environmental protection inside the WTO more directly, for fear that social clauses will
be used as bases for protectionism. Implicit in this position is the assumption that social
clauses cannot today be used as bases for protectionism. In order to advance coherent
policy-making in these areas, at levels that will satisfy the wealthier states, it will be
necessary to establish mechanisms to guard against protectionism. It may also be
necessary to provide compensation to poorer states in exchange for their willingness to
accept standards that may otherwise be inappropriate, or simply too costly, for their
society or level of development. Compensation could be provided through trade
liberalization or even through direct monetary settlements.
Outside the WTO, the broader international system responds to the problem of
coherence, but perhaps in too limited a fashion. The broader international system is
characterized by decentralized global lawmaking, and decentralized global adjudication.
This decentralized system does not satisfactorily respond to the need, under
circumstances of varying and shifting legislative sources, to resolve conflicts between
rules.
Conflicts between rules are the legal face of conflicts between different values.
The core issue is a choice of law problem, not between states in a horizontal legal order,
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nor between component political entities and a central government. Rather, it is an interfunctional choice of law problem, between law that arises in different sectors of the
international legal system, from different functional and institutional contexts. These
contexts overlap like tectonic plates, and sometimes collide with one another, causing
discontinuity and disruption.
The current structure of the international legal system for dealing with diverse
legal rules from diverse sources is certainly troublesome, utilizing formal last-in-time
rules or perhaps a lex specialis rule to address some of the most important normative
issues faced by international society. Over the next 50 years, we may expect to see more
negotiations in an effort to develop more nuanced means to integrate different global
values, such as trade, environment, and human rights. These negotiations will result in
nuanced rules and institutional development. They will no doubt reduce the
indeterminacy arising from wide variation in the arrangements for adjudication in
different subject areas—from functionally decentralized international adjudication. But
they will not eliminate it. After all, states need the flexibility to create norms of varying
binding force. Thus, we can expect development of the interfunctional constitution both
within and without the WTO legal system.
Interfunctional constitutions can also be understood in terms of constitutional
economics. Interfunctional constitutions facilitate intersectoral tradeoffs among different
categories of preferences. In terms of the theory of the firm, they bring within a single
institution the different categories of preferences that otherwise would intersect in the
market of the general international legal system. This theoretical perspective provides a
ready understanding that there will be some functional areas that should be addressed
together within a single international organization, and others that will be better
addressed separately.25
Constitutions of Politics, Democracy, Legitimacy and Subsidiarity
It is obvious but nonetheless important to acknowledge that the WTO will never
look like a state. Fortunately, there will never be WTO anthems or a pledge of allegiance
to the WTO, even in economics classrooms. Constitutions are associated by some with
nationhood, or better, peoplehood. Joseph Weiler points out that the European Union
itself lacks a “constitutional demos,” and so is not rooted in a central federal-type
power.26 The WTO has much less of a constitutional demos. Could a pretense of this
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type of constitution at the WTO level result in a hollowing of the real constitutional
politics of the state?
Notwithstanding this shared concern for maintaining local identity and coherence,
many cosmopolitans wish for a sense of global solidarity and social justice. The WTO
represents for them a welcome rejection of irredentism, and the establishment of a global
community of trade that ignores ethnic and historical divisions. Protectionism has its
strongest roots in irredentism. Which comes first, the constitutional governance
structures or the social feeling in which the governance structures must be rooted? They
clearly have a dialectical relationship, but the force is not always centripetal.
In the U.S., the Commerce Clause of the Constitution serves a dual negative
integration and positive integration role. The “negative” or dormant Commerce Clause is
used by courts to strike down state legislation that interferes inappropriately with
interstate commerce. The “positive” Commerce Clause authorizes federal legislative
power to regulate interstate commerce. Interestingly, in this context of the same textual
provision, the positive power has, through judicial acceptance, far outstripped the
negative discipline. That is, the federal government’s power to legislate, limited only by
the identification of a plausible interstate commerce relationship or effect, is far broader
than the scope of state measures that will be found to violate the negative Commerce
Clause. The EC also combines negative integration power with positive integration
power, although the positive integration power is somewhat narrower than that which
exists in the U.S.
The WTO, on the other hand, generally requires consensus or unanimity,
depending on the context and the informal modifications of the formal rules, in order to
engage in positive integration. In this sense, it might be said that the WTO has
substantial negative integration power, but lacks substantial positive integration power. It
is not a “member organization” when it comes to negative integration, but certainly is
when it comes to positive integration.
If the imbalance between adjudicative power and legislative power, and between
trade values and other values, were addressed by enhanced legislative power at the WTO,
another concern would be exacerbated: the concern for democratic accountability at the
WTO. 27 Increased legislative power could take the form of majority, or supermajority,
voting at the WTO.
The democracy deficit in international organizations is in substance a combined
question of the degree of distance from parliamentary accountability, and subsidiarity.
From a constitutional economics perspective, democracy plays an important instrumental
role in enhancing the revelation of preferences expressed through the democratic process,
27
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and in enhancing the fidelity of governmental operatives as agents of citizens. Thus, the
WTO’s own democracy deficit could be addressed by enhancing parliamentary
accountability at the WTO, either by making domestic arrangements for greater domestic
parliamentary involvement in WTO legislation, or through a WTO parliamentary body.
Here, it is necessary to link the WTO’s constitution to its member states’
constitutions. To the extent that the WTO is truly a “member organization”—an
international as opposed to transnational organization—perhaps the democracy deficit
critique is misguided, and the real question is one of member state democracy. Or if
some member states lack influence in the WTO, perhaps the democracy deficit would be
addressed through national empowerment, rather than the addition of parliamentary
control at the WTO level. Furthermore, the WTO’s democracy deficit is caused by the
scope of subject matters the WTO addresses: this democracy deficit could be addressed
by reducing the scope of WTO action. But even with more democracy at the WTO, the
question would still remain whether the WTO is the right place to address particular
issues. This is the question of subsidiarity.
Voting arrangements may be analyzed through the lens of constitutional
economics. Voting arrangements are initially understood as mechanisms of
accountability; ensuring that the governmental agent is accountable to its constituents.
But how do we explain majority voting? As suggested above, majority voting arises in
contexts of veils of uncertainty, where the parties are unable to determine ex antewhether
agreeing to majority voting will harm them or hurt them, or whether surplus created by a
move to majority voting will be distributed largely to them or largely to other
constituents.
Broader groups of issues under a single majority voting umbrella may enhance
the possibility of constructive uncertainty. This suggests that interfunctional
constitutions may provide ex ante uncertainty as to the likely outcome of majority voting,
possibly making a move to majority voting more likely.
Legal Constitutions
Legal constitutions have two components: assignment of legislative capacity, and
judicial review. Secondary legal rules—constitutional rules—are the handmaiden of the
economic, political and social forces that form the substance of social interaction.
However, legal rules are both products and producers of constitutional change. For
example, certain kinds of constitutional development may lead to demand for more
constitutional development. The surprising 1994 advance in binding dispute settlement
has created a perceived imbalance between dispute settlement and treaty-making:
between adjudication and legislation. Treaty-making is difficult, because as a practical
matter it requires unanimity to amend the WTO treaties, or to make new treaties.
Some of the gaps in the agreements previously agreed are filled by adjudication.
Some of these gaps seem to have constitutional dimensions, such as the role of judicial
review in balance of payments cases, or the ability to incorporate into WTO law
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standards produced at Codex Alimentarius by majority voting. (Codex Alimentarius was
created in 1963 by the Food and Agricultural Organization and the World Health
Organization to develop food standards.) While the WTO Appellate Body has been
prudent and has avoided extensive “judicial legislation,”28 or judicial centralism, it has
been required to decide the cases presented to it, and many of these cases have involved
matters the negotiators never considered, or matters they considered and failed to resolve.
It would be politically impossible, and patently undesirable, to accord to the WTO
broad majority voting-based legislative power similar to that held by domestic
legislatures. However, it might be possible to accord narrower legislative, or quasilegislative, power to the WTO, especially in some of the contexts where the alternative to
international legislation is international adjudication.
The WTO agreements contain nuances that show the beginning of narrow
legislative capacity, not within the WTO itself, but incorporated into the WTO from other
international bodies. One of the most important examples is the reference in WTO law to
international standards, such as those produced by Codex Alimentarius, or the
International Standards Organization, in the WTO agreements. In the WTO Agreement
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (human, animal and plant health) Measures, and in the
WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, domestic product standards are
required, with certain important exceptions, to be based on international standards, and
domestic measures that conform to international standards are provided substantial
protection from scrutiny as potential illegal trade barriers. In the Sardinescase decided
by the WTO Appellate Body under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, even
Codex Alimentarius rules produced by majority vote had this effect.29
These types of quasi-legislation, delegated by the WTO to these other bodies,
present important questions about democratic accountability, and about the capacity of
developing states to participate. However, as more circumstances arise where it seems
useful in trade terms to develop some quasi-legislative capacity in order to balance
adjudicative capacity, to promote inter-sectoral coherence or to advance free trade, we
may see some constitutional moments—small or large—that will develop greater
legislative capacity at the WTO.
The U.S. and the EU have the internal experience of judicial constitutionalization.
The European Court of Justice developed doctrines of supremacy, preemption, direct
effect and judicial review in a way that gave impetus to political integration and,
eventually, constitutional amendment.30 Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the European
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Court of Justice showed themselves to be keenly aware of the relative need and political
appetite for constitutionalization of this type. They have grasped constitutional moments.
The WTO Appellate Body has had only limited experience, but has demonstrated a
similar sensitivity in such decisions as India-Quantitative Restrictions, regarding the
balance between political and judicial decision-making.
One of the signal features of legal constitutionalization is understood by many to
be direct effect. Direct effect, of course, is not necessarily a relevant feature in domestic
constitutionalization, but it may have significance in an international setting, and was an
important feature of the development of the EC constitution. Direct effect actually
involves the integration of levels: the utilization by international legal rules of the more
binding dispute settlement available in domestic law. By finding that EC law had direct
effect in the courts of member states, the ECJ both gave EC law greater binding effect
and gave individuals greater control over the development of EC law.31
The selection of areas and rules for incorporation in the WTO legal system entails
a kind of dynamic subsidiarity. That is, through specific adjudication and legislative
action, there is a dynamic division of authority between states and the WTO itself.32 This
division can adjust to changing needs, technologies and social structures over time. The
WTO constitution includes additional dynamic features, such as the relationship between
horizontal and vertical federalism, and the institutional balance between dispute
settlement and adjudication.
Legal constitutions allocate authority, including legislative power, and may be
assumed to do so in a manner that maximizes opportunities for preference-maximizing
arrangements through majority voting or other legislative techniques. Legal constitutions
may also assist functional constitutions by referring quasi-legislative authority, such as
that accorded the Codex Alimentarius by the SPS Agreement, to external functional
organizations. Legal constitutions may further assist functional constitutionalization
through judicial referral of issues, either directly or through interpretation, to external
functional organizations or other external sources of functional law. Allocation of
discretion to judges provides implicit authorization for this type of referral.33
Judicial constitutionalization is also explicable in terms of constitutional
economics. In these terms, it is not surprising that states would explicitly or implicitly
delegate authority to judges, either to interpret or develop law, or to apply their normative
outlook to particular contexts as they may arise.
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Finally, while the WTO may internally have a constitutional structure, the broader
international legal system has one as well. Moreover, other functional entities, such as
the EU, the IMF, UNEP, etc., have constitutional structures also. We might consider a
special kind of secondary rule, or a tertiary rule, that allocates authority among
constitutional structures. Indeed, we might observe a kind of global functional
federalism, in which the center is the general international legal system and the periphery
is the functional organization. It is not clear where ultimate power lies. So, as in the
EU, a nuanced constitutional dialog between the center and the periphery may emerge.
Human Rights Constitutions
The WTO will not soon, and may never, embody the kind of human rights order
that individuals hope for in our domestic societies. The critical issue here regards the
vocation of the WTO, and its advantage compared to states themselves, human rights
treaties, the United Nations and other bodies. In domestic societies, constitutionalism
entails a normative commitment to the rule of law, minority rights, and other human
rights. Subsidiarity would suggest that most aspects of these values can normally be
decided and provided well at the level of the state. A kind of functional subsidiarity
would suggest that even where the state is inadequate to protect human rights, the WTO
may not be the multilateral place to house human rights efforts.34 However, the WTO or
other multilateral organizations may become involved in linkages or conditionality
relating to these types of issues.
Just as the EU’s constitutional evolution has required the delicately negotiated
insertion of human rights sensibilities and norms, so too will the WTO’s evolution
require human rights-type constraints. Some argue that this has already occurred by
virtue of the fact that WTO law is part of the general international legal system.35
However, while states are not generally relieved by WTO law of their human rights
obligations, the internal WTO dispute settlement system does not provide for the general
application of human rights law to modify WTO law. In order to provide for a more
nuanced integration between WTO law and human rights law within WTO dispute
settlement, constitutional changes in WTO law would be required. In effect, the WTO
dispute settlement system, created to put to an end the regime of auto-interpretation in
connection with WTO law, would require a broader mandate than the one that presently
exists.
Here again, it is necessary to consider the big picture. That is, the WTO
constitution exists within the broader international legal system, and therefore benefits
34

See Armin von Bogdandy, The European Union as a Human Rights Organization?
Human Rights and the Core of the European Union, 37 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 1307, 1337
(2000) (suggesting that not all organizations need to be imbued with human rights
competence). See also Trachtman, supra note 6.
35
See JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW
WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge University
Press 2003).

20
from the human rights system that exists. And so, within the broader international legal
system, there is a significant human rights dimension. This human rights dimension of
the broader global constitution complements and supports the WTO constitution. We
must also recognize the role played by domestic constitutions in supplying the human
rights dimension.
Human rights constitutions can be explained in the language of constitutional
economics. Modeling constitutions as entered into under Harsanyian veils of uncertainty,
certain human rights provisions may make sense to protect individuals, who may ex post
find themselves in the minority, from abuse by the majority. Human rights may also be
understood in distributive terms, as redistributive claims. This is easiest to see in
connection with certain economic and social rights, such as the right to development or
the right to health. But it is also true with respect to certain other kinds of rights in the
sense, and to the extent, that these rights may be exchanged for wealth or other values.
Redistribution
We must also recognize that constitutions have distributive effects and may serve
redistributive functions. For example, constitutions may produce the kind of solidarity
that can serve as the basis for redistribution. Even the rights established by domestic
constitutions may be understood as claims for redistribution. The WTO is an engine for
creating global wealth. It has not yet confronted directly questions regarding the global
distribution of its benefits, although the Cancun demarche of cotton-producing countries
Benin, Burkina-Faso, Chad, and Mali may be seen as the opening move in direct
confrontation. And of course, such demands are powerfully expressed in the broader
international legal system.
Every society needs a mechanism by which to express solidarity with those who
are in need, especially those whose need results from the structure of society itself. This
is the teaching of Polanyi and Ruggie: the political need for a liberalism that is
embedded in a redistributive regulatory structure.36
The WTO is both a result and a cause of greater global interdependence, and of
the development of global society. To avoid disruption of this global society, by
demarches in trade, economic catastrophes or violent upheavals in member states, or
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terrorism, it is morally and politically necessary to develop mechanisms to enhance the
position of the poor.37
Constitutional reforms may be a necessary part of a redistributive settlement at the
WTO. These constitutional reforms may include a modification of decision-making that
would provide more power to the poor, or the establishment of rights that effect
redistribution to the poor. At the WTO, the main focus for the poor in the near future will
be on mechanisms to produce greater liberalization in sectors in which the poor could
compete. While this type of broadening of the scope of competition is central to the
WTO project, it has been frustrated in the past by differentials in power and engagement.
Constructing the Elephants
Let us begin to place some connective tissue on these components of
constitutionalization. The main source of analytical connective tissue, already described
above, is constitutional economics, based on methodological and normative
individualism. Each type of constitution described above is seen through this lens as a
means of achieving individual preferences.
Constitutional economics is, of course, not limited to economic constitutions.
Rather, it is an analytical technique that may encompass any type of preference, including
human rights, environmental preservation, nationalism and political accountability and
redistribution. So, constitutional economics examines each type of constitution through
the same lens: maximizing individual preferences. This does not mean that the
constitutional economics analysis is simple. To the contrary, a constitutional economics
analysis allows us to place in context each of the values—whether they are process-based
or substantive values—in order to determine how they might be integrated with one
another, and in order to evaluate them.
Constitutional economics, like economics in general, is agnostic as to the types of
preferences that will be articulated, or the way that individuals will value each
preference. It assumes only that each individual has different preferences and enters
society in order to maximize these preferences.
Therefore, constitutional economics does not accept preemptive values such as
human rights, environmental protection, or wealth maximization. It would accept that
some of these preferences are valued more greatly than others. For example, it may
understand core human rights as preferences that are so highly valued that they rarely are
trumped by other values.
We recognize that there are good reasons for international trade agreements, and
that these agreements may have constitutional dimensions. In constitutional economics
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terms, at the outset, it may be valuable to allocate some legislative power, and judicial
review-type power, to a centralized institution.
One critical constitutional feature is a type of dynamic subsidiarity that may allow
shifts in allocations of power over time, or that may allow for contingent allocations that
only arise under specified conditions. We can see modest and nuanced legislative
capacity within the WTO, and shared between the WTO and other functional
organizations. The WTO already has significant “judicial review” functions with respect
to member state measures, although again it is important to recognize that the scope of
this judicial review is determined, and limited, by the substantive legal norm applied:
national treatment, least trade restrictive alternative, requirement for scientific basis, or
otherwise.
Economic constitutions in this sense collide with interfunctional constitutions and
human rights constitutions. The scope for WTO-based legislation, and adjudication, both
legally and politically, is constrained by other values that are articulated elsewhere, or
that are articulated within WTO law or WTO negotiations. After all, the WTO is a
member organization and states would not be expected to agree at the WTO to do
something that they reject elsewhere.
The degree of “coherence” between other values and those expressed more
directly in WTO law depends on the specificity of arrangements for legislative or judicial
integration of values. These arrangements may be made within the WTO or in the
broader international legal system. To the extent that these arrangements are made
through dispute settlement, it must be recognized that judges will be accorded authority
to make important trade-offs between values. While this may take place without incident
in some domestic systems, it may be a challenge to the legitimacy of the WTO judicial
function.38
Challenges to the judicial function may be alleviated by allocation of greater
competence to the legislative function in international society. While the general
international legal system has, in a sense, plenary legislative authority—there are no
fields which seem outside the jurisdiction of international law, provided that states
consent—its legislative capacity is limited by the general requirement of individual state
consent. So, it may be that greater adjudicative attempts to deal with the problem of
coherence may lead to greater demands for majority voting or other means to overcome
strategic problems raised by the requirement of individual state consent. Of course, with
greater legislative capacity will come a greater need for democratic accountability. Here,
the question that must be asked is whether and to what extent centralized parliamentary
structures can and should be established to provide centralized accountability.
Interfunctional constitutions may also contribute to the making, and the
enforcement, of economic constitutions. They may because the possibility of a wider
scope for treaty-making bargaining may increase the scope of possible arrangements.
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Furthermore, a wider scope of coverage may result in greater enforceability of the
relevant treaty.39 It is also necessary to recognize that human rights and redistribution are
special forms of interfunctional constitutional arrangements. According to the theory of
embedded liberalism, these, and perhaps other regulatory structures are necessary
features of stable economic constitutions. Furthermore, we might understand some of
these interfunctional issues as relating to the concept of “collective preferences” recently
popularized by the European Union. In a sense, all preferences expressed through
governmental action should be collective preferences: shared preferences that are
appropriately expressed through government, rather than through the market.
We might say that claims for human rights and claims for redistribution are
similar in some respects to other kinds of non-trade values. Some claims for human
rights might even be understood as implicit claims for redistribution. However, in a
constitutional economics framework, some claims for human rights must be understood
as pre-emptive in their value and force—while they are theoretically subject to trade-offs,
they are so highly valued as to be unlikely to be sacrificed in any particular case.
Redistribution is of a different order. From an embedded liberalism standpoint,
we might find that the price of an economic constitution is the establishment of a
redistributive constitution. From a Rawlsian perspective, we might find that the
establishment of economic and other forms of constitution form the community basis for
the operation of the difference principle, validating claims for redistribution.40
The Elephant and the Responsible Organization: Justifying the WTO Constitution
Project
The WTO’s constitution is malleable. We must steer between the Scylla of false
limitation assumed by those who say the WTO can never have a constitution, and the
Charybdis of those who would use constitutional discourse artificially to constrain certain
claims, and ask instead what are the socially desirable areas of development and how do
these areas of development relate to one another. The goal of this essay has been to begin
to describe some of the bases and dynamics of change, and to promote a dialog of
possibility, rather than one of false limitation.
To the extent that the WTO is understood as a “member-driven organization,” we
must look to member states as the parties responsible for continuing problems. However,
these member states experience difficult collective action problems under regimes of
unanimous approval of new treaties or treaty amendments. In order to resolve these
problems and move forward to create arrangements that benefit individual WTO
constituents, it may become necessary to extend the constitution of the WTO, and its
responsibility.
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It is clear that the six constitutional dimensions of the WTO presented above—
economic, human rights, functional, legal, political and redistributive—interact with one
another. They both impose constraints on one another and call for advances in one
another—they are part of a larger system, an integrated organism. Of course, the WTO
will never be a state, but it will change along these dimensions, in response to the
changing needs of society. Yet the WTO competes, along vertical and horizontal
dimensions. It competes on a vertical dimension with the state and with the general
international legal order. It competes along a horizontal dimension with other functional
organizations.41 This competition may be beneficial from a constitutional economics
perspective, to the extent that it may result in a nuanced institutional structure that
maximizes achievement of individual preferences.
Constitutional design of the WTO will respond to constitutional moments: to
moments in which it is clear to states that they can benefit broadly from institutional
change, without a clear understanding of the precise distributive consequences of the
change. This paper suggests that constitutional change may proceed along a number of
dimensions, and in a number of different institutional settings. This paper has begun to
suggest some of the relationships among these different dimensions and settings. It has
done so not to advance a particular constitutional structure or agenda, but to suggest the
complexity of the analytical project.
* * *
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